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BILLS AND NOTEs-NoTICE OF EXECUTORY CONSIDERATION-CONDITIONS
IN CONTEMPORANEOUS DOCUMENTS.-SUmTEk Co. STATE BANK V. HAYS
ET AL., 67 So. (FLA.) Iog.-Held, that an indorsee of a negotiable note
given for a stock subscription, who takes with knowledge of a contempo-
raneous document setting forth an executory consideration, with a pro-
vision for cancellation of the subscription on a specified contingency, is
not a holder in due course.
By the general law of bilateral contracts an executory promise would
generally be construed as conditional upon a substantial performance
of the executory consideration up to date. Kingston v. Preston, 2 Doug.
689. This construction may of course be obviated by an unequivocal
expression of intention to the contrary. By the great weight of authority
a person affixing his signature to a negotiable instrument indicates prima
facie his intention to make a promise unconditioned upon performance on
the other side. Arthur v. Hart, 17 How. 6; Davis v. McCready, 17 N. Y.
230; Chapman v. Eddy, 13 Vt. 2o5. Especially, though not exclusively,
is this true when performance of the reciprocal agreement is not to be
complete until after maturity. Morrison v. Hart, 122 Ga. 66o. A fortiori,
when performance is entirely postponed to maturity. Hudson v. Best,
io4 Ga. 131; Nat. Bank v. Floss, 38 Ore. 68. This has been carried so
far as to exclude the defense of non-performance of executory considera-
tion even between immediate parties. Waterhouse v. Kendall, ii Cush.
(Mass.) 128; Chapman v. Eddy, supra. But such a defense would in
such case generally be admitted as a total or partial failure of considera-
tion. Kelly v. Webb, 27 Tex. 368. In accordance with these views the
mention of the executory consideration on the face of the instrument
does not render the promise conditional, thereby destroying the negoti-
ability of the paper. Siegel v. Trust & Savings Bank, 131 Ill. 569. Contra,
Howard v. Kimball, 65 N. C. 178. However, a contemporaneous written
agreement, either in terms or by identity of subject-matter referring to
a note, and expressly imposing a condition thereto, is binding between the
original parties. Rogers v. Smith, 47 N. Y. 324; Machine Co. v. Wood,
go Me. 516; Hunt v. Livemnore, 5 Pick. (Mass.) 395. By the better view
a purchaser with knowledge of the terms of such agreement is also bound
by the conditions. Thomas v. Paige, 3 McLean 167; Sutton v. Beckwith,
68 Mich. 3o3; Hill v. Huntress, 43 N. H. 48o (indorsed after maturity).
Contra, Jennings v. Todd, 118 Mo. 296 (note to e void in a certain con-
tingency) ; Adams v. Smith, 35 Me. 324 (payment conditional) ; Black v.
First Nat. Bank, 96 Md. 399 (condition, with agreement not to negotiate).
In so far as these conditions rendered further negotiation a breach of
faith, the cases last cited cannot be the law under the Act, Secs. 52 and 55.
However, courts tend strongly to construe conditions in stock subscrip-
tions as subsequent and not precedent. Swartout v. R. R. Co., 24 Mich.
389; Chamberlain v. R. R. Co., 15o L. St. 225. And extreme reluctance
is shown in allowing conditions to negotiable instruments, even when
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express reference is made to them. Atwood v. Lewis, 6 Mo. 392. Much
more, it should be expected, where, as in the principal case, no such ref-
erence is made. On the ground chosen, notice of executory considera-
tion, the principal case is contrary to the overwhelming weight of
authority.
BILLS AND NOTES-MAKERS WrO ARE LIABLE AS SUCIr.-NEw ENGLAND
ELECTRIC COMPANY V. SHOAK ET AL., 145 PAC. (CoLo.) OO2.-Held,
where a note for a corporate obligation, bearing the corporate seal,
and reciting that, "I, we (and each of us) promise to pay," etc., was
signed first by the corporation and then by the defendants, who
appended to their names the titles,' "President" and "Secretary," that
defendants are not personally liable on the note.
"Where the instrument contains or a person adds to his signature
words indicating that he signs for or on behalf of a principal, or in a
representative capacity, he is not liable on the instrument if he was
duly authorized; but the mere addition of words describing him as an
agent, or as filling a representative character, without disclosing his
principal, does not exempt him from personal liability." The Negotiable
Instruments Law, Sec. 2o. This does not change the common-law
rule. Metcalfe v. Williams, 104 U. S. 93; Megowan v. Peterson, 173
N. Y. I. Tlje question in each case is whether the words added are
words of description or words of indication. Brockway v. Allen, 17
Wend. (N. Y.) 4o; Bank v. Ariss, 123 Pac. (Wash.) 592. When the
principal does not appear as a co-signer, the presumption is that the
added words are descriptio personae. Brockway v. Allen, supra;
Schumacher v. Dolan, 134 N. W. (Iowa) 624. But parol evidence is
admissible to show that, as against the plaintiff, the words indicated a
principal. Decowski v. Grabarski, i81 Ill. App. 279. The words do not
constitute notice. Bank v. Wallis, 15o N. Y. 455. Therefore, as against
a holder without actual knowledge of the agency the words are merely
descriptio personae, and parol evidence of the agency is inadmissible.
Megowan v. Peterson, supra; Bank v. Love, 13 App. Div. (N. Y.) 561.
Where the name of the principal appears above that of the alleged
agent, the instrument is prima facie that of the principal. Aungst v.
Creque, 72 Oh. St. 551; Thompson v. Hasselmaq, 131 Ili. App. 257.
Similarly, when the seal of the corporation appears on the instrument.
Reed v. Fleming, 209 Ill. 390. In such case, even where the agent added
no designating words to his name, parol evidence was admitted to free
him from liability, against the payee, in Dunbar Company v. Martin,
1O3 N. Y. Supp. 91; against a holder in due course, in Bank v. Mariner,
129 Wis. 544. The use of the pronouns "I," "we," and "I or we,"
is immaterial in determining the liability of the agent. Wilson v. Fite,
46 S. W. (Tenn.) 1O56; Williams v. Harris, 198 Ill. 501.
BROKERS-COMPENSATION-ACTING FOR BOTH PARTIES.-SCARBOROUGH &
DARNELL v. STAGNER, 171 S. W. (TEx.) IO49.-Held, a broker may recover
a commission from his principal, a vendor, although he has employed
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another to act for him in executing the principal's business, and that
other has, without the knowledge of the vendor, also represented the
purchaser in the transaction.
If an agent of a vendor is, unknown to that vendor, also agent for
the purchaser, he may not collect a commission from the vendor. Moore
v. Kelley, 162 S. W. (Tex.) 1034; Walker v. Osgood, 98 Mass. 348. In
fact, it has been held that under these circumstances he can collect
from neither. Bell v. McConnell, 37 Oh. St. 396; Rice v. Wood, 113
Mass. 133. Even though the party sought to be charged knew of the
double agency, provided the other principal did not. Chapman v. Currie,
5I Mo. App. 4o; Neal v. Adkins, 145 S. W. (Tex.) 264. Contra, Jamnan
v. McCusick, 166 Cal. 517. The fact that the sale was advantageous to
the principal is immaterial. Cannell v. Smith, 142 Pa. St. 25. But he may
act for both parties when they have so consented. Jarvis v. Schaefer,
1O5 N. Y. 289; Barry v. Schmidt, 57 Wis. 172. Also when he acts merely
as middleman to bring the parties together, although neither of them
knew of his agency for the other. Ranney v. Donovan, 78 Mich. 318;
Rupp v. Sampson, 16 Gray (Mass.) 398. The reason advanced for the
general doctrine that one agent may not act for two parties whose inter-
ests conflict is that the temptations to defraud are so great that it is
contrary to public policy to allow it; the law will presume fraud. As
to the principal case if there is anything in the maxim that the acts of
an agent are the acts of his principal (Story on Agency, ninth ed., 2),
it seems clear that the broker, plaintiff, who has employed one who is
also acting for the other side, has himself acted for both sides, and is
therefore entitled to no commission, and the defendant should be allowed
to take advantage of this in a suit for a commission.
CHATTEL MORTGAGES-INvALIDITY AS TO CREDITORS-PossEssIoN BY
MORTGAGOR-BAILLARGEON V. DUmONLIN, 151 N. Y. Supp. 112.-Held,
that a chattel mortgage on a stock of merchandise remaining in the
possession of the mortgagor, who continues in business, disposing of the
stock and replacing stock and carrying on trade with knowledge of the
mortgagee, is fraudulent as against creditors.
A mortgage void as to creditors and purchasers may be good as
between the parties. Bagley v. Harmon, 91 Mo. App. 22. At common
law, the delivery or change of possession, either actual or constructive,
was essential to the validity of a chattel mortgage as against third
persons. Goodnow v. Dunn, 21 Me. 86; Russell v. Fillmore, I5 Vt.
13o. Practically all the states now permit the recording of chattel
mortgages and in general consider it as the equivalent of change of
possession of the property. Berson v. Nunan, 63 Cal. 550; Holman v.
Doran, 56 Ind. 358. Although the mortgage is duly recorded, in a
few jurisdictions a legal presumption of fraud arises from the continued
possession of the property by the mortgagor. Smith v. Acker, 23 Wend.
653; Severance v. Leavitt, 16 Nebr. 439. With regard to the doctrine
of the principal, case, the states are about equally divided and those
contra hold that the power given to a mortgagor in a mortgage of
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a stock of goods to sell the goods in the regular course of trade, does
not of itself avoid the mortgage. Louden v. Vinton, io8 Mich. 313;
Fletcher v. Powers, 131 Mass. 333. Those cases in harmony with the
principal case make a mortgage void as to creditors when the mortgagor
remains in possession disposing of the mortgaged goods in the usual
course of business without accounting in any manner to the mortgagee.
Gee v. Van Natta Lynds Drug Co., io5 Mo. App. 27; Gillespie v.
McClaskie, i6o Ala. 289. And in the latter cases the recording of the
mortgage cannot make it valid, for the recording of a mortgage is
merely constructive notice of its terms and when the mortgage includes
the right of disposition for the use and benefit of the mortgagor, it is
deemed fraudulent in law. Zartman v. First National Bank, 189 N. Y.
267. But where a power of sale contained in a mortgage covers only
a part of the property subject thereto, it is generally held that though
mortgage is void in part, it is valid as to the property not included in
the power of sale. Cook v. Halsell, 65 Tex. i. It should be noted that
the holding of the principal case does not apply when mortgage stipulates
that the mortgagor is required to account to the mortgagee for the
proceeds of the sale which proceeds are to be applied in payment of
the debt. Skilton v. Codington, 185 N. Y. 8o; Dunham v. Stevens, i6o
Mo. 95; Stevens v. Curral, 28"Mont. 366.
CONTRACTs-CONsIDERATioN-LEGAL DUTY TO THnn PERsoN.-PoETYME
v. LowRY, 144 PAc. (CAL.) 981.-Held, that a promise to perform a
prefxisting duty to a third person is no consideration for a second
promise.
It is agreed that the performance of, or the promise to perform, an
existing legal duty to the promisor is no consideration to support a
promise. Lingenfelder v. Brewing Co., 103 Mo. 578. The minority of
cases which seem to override this rule, do so upon the theory of an
abrogation in some manner of the previous contract. Munroe v.
Perkins,. 9 Pick. (Mass.) 298. Or upon the erroneous theory of a sur-
render by the promisee of the alleged alternative privilege of incurring
damages rather than performing in specie. Lattimore v. Harsen, 14
Johns. (N. Y.) 330. The rule is generally stated as applying also to
legal duties to persons other than the promisor. Kenigsberger v. Win-
gate, 31 Tex. 42; Sherwin v. Brigham, 39 Oh. St. 137; Johnson v.
Seller, 33 Ala. 265. In the case of non-contractual duties, it has not been
necessary so to decide, as the illegal character of the consideration
would be an all-sufficient ground. Accordingly, in such cases, courts
often proceed upon the illegality, rather than upon the absence, of
consideration. Voorhees v. Reed, 17 Ill. App. 21; Warner v. Grace, 14
Minn. 487. And many of the decisions in apparent accord with the
principal case might well have gone upon the ground of a preexisting
legal obligation to the promisor himself. Arend v. Smith, 151 N. Y.
502; Drill Co. v. Ashhurst, 148 Ill. 115. The majority doctrine has,
of course, no application in the case of an absolute undertaking to
perform what one was only conditionally obligated to a third person
to do. Green v. Kelly, 64 Vt. 309. Several deviations from the prevalent
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doctrine are to be noted. First, a promise to perform a pre~xisting con-
tractual obligation to a third person, as distinguished from performance
itself, has been admitted as sufficient consideration. Merrick v. Gid-
dings, I Mack. (D. C.) 394. Second, where the second promisor has a
direct interest in the performance of the original undertaking, such
performance or promise to perform is sufficient consideration. Donnelly
v. Newbold, 94 Md. 22o; Hirsch v. Carpet Co., 82 Ill. App. 234; Hamer
v. Decatur Co., 98 Ala. 461. Third, in a few jurisdictions th doctrine
of the principal case has been repudiated altogether. Abbott v. Doane,
163 Mass. 433; Scotson v. Pegg, 6 H. & N. 295; Chdmplain Co. v.
O'Brien, 117 Fed. 271; Wilhelm v. Foss, 118 Mich. io6 (point not dis-
cussed). See Day v. Gardner, 42 N. J. Eq. i99. On principle there
seems no reason why either a performance, or a promise to perform,
should not be a sufficient, if legal, consideration, if it be something
which the second promisor wished to procure in return for his promise,
and to which he had previously no legal right, whatever may have been
the previous rights of third parties thereto.
CONVERSION-CUTTING TimBER-MEAsuRE OF DAMAGES.-SIBELLE V.
EASTHAM, 67 So. (LA.) 364-Held, that one who cuts timber on the
land of another in good faith, believing it to be his own land, is liable
for the value of the timber before the cutting, and not as manufactured
into lumber.
When property is severed from the freehold and converted by the
defendant, the prevailing view is that if the defendant acted in good
faith, the measure of damages is the value of the property as it was just
before the wrongful act of the defendant. Forsyth v. Wells, 41 Pa. 291;
Bond v. Griff en, 74 Miss. 599; U. S. v. McKee, 128 Fed. ioo2; Wood v.
Morewood, 3 Q. B. 44o. Certain American courts, however, have allowed
recovery of the whole value of ihe property, after its severance. In the
case of Brozmt v. Sax, 7 Cow. (N. Y.) 95, Sutherland J., dissenting, the
facts were the same as in the principal case, and the plaintiff recovered
the value of the boards manufactured from the lumber. In the follow-
ing cases the measure of damages was held to be the value of the logs
just after they were felled. White v. Yawkey, io8 Ala. 270; Moody v.
Whitney, 38 Me. 174; U. S. v. St. Anthony R. Co., 192 U. S. 524. Where
the defendant knowingly converted property severed from the plaintiff's
land, the measure of damages is everywhere held to be the value of the
property at the time of the conversion, that is, after the severance.
Meloon v. Read, 73 N. H. 153; Foster v. Weaver, ii8 Pa. 42; Wooden
Ware Co. v. U. S., lo6 U. S. 432. The rule of the principal case seems
the just view, since it restricts the plaintiff to compensation for his actual
loss, where the defendant has acted in good faith.
CRIMINAL LAw-AsSAULT AND BArrERY-EXCESSIVE SPEED OF AUTO-
MOBILE-STATE V. ScHUTTE, 93 ATL. (N. J.) 112.-Held, that a conviction
for assault and battery was sustained by proof that the defendant ran
RECENT CASES
his automobile at a rate of speed which exceeded that allowed by law,
which endangered the public safety, and which actually resulted in the
injury of a pedestrian.
An assault and battery may be committed by wilfully hitting another
with an automobile. Schneider v. State, IO4 N. E. (Ind.) 69. Gross
negligence or the wilful, wanton or reckless disregard of the safety of
others is a basis for imputing to the negligent person the criminal intent
which is the essential ingredient of crime. Thomas v. The People, 2
Colo. App. 513. So, persons who recklessly and negligently, or wantonly
and wilfully, drive a horse and team upon the highway at a dangerous
rate of speed are criminally liable for the results thereof. Belk et al. v.
The People, 125 Ill. 584; Rex v. Walker, i C. P. 320; Rex v. Timmins,
7 C. & P. 499. A verdict of guilty in an action for assault and battery
will be sustained where there is evidence of reckless speed and reckless
running of an automobile. Commonwealth v. Bergdoll, 55 Pa. Sup. Ct.
186. If the injury occasioned by the collision results in death, the culpable
party may be justly convicted of manslaughter, if the collision was caused
directly by such gross carelessness as to indicate an indifference to
consequences, or by the commission of an unlawful act. State v. Goets,
83 Conn. 437; Luther v. State, 98 N. E. (Ind.) 64o; State v. Watson,
216 Mo. 42o; People v. Danagh, 141 N. Y. App. 4o8. Would the mere
violation of a statute regulating speed-the commission of an unlawful
act-of itself supply the criminal intent necessary? In Commonwealth
v. Adams, 114 Mass. 313, it was held that one driving a horse at an
unlawful rate was not guilty of criminal assault and battery, as the act
was merely inalum prohibitum and not malon in se. This same distinc-
tion in not implying criminal intent from an act merely malum prohibi-
turn is recoguized in i East. P. C. 260; i Bishop's Criminal Law 204.
In Commonwealth v. Hawkins, 157 Mass. 551, it was held that the fact
that the defendant discharged a revolver in violation of a city ordinance
was proper evidence for the consideration of the jury on the question
of negligence, inasmuch as recklessness or gross carelessness lay at the
foundation of the action, but would not of itself be sufficient to impute
a criminal intent to the defendant. Likewise in People v. Scanlon, 132
N. Y. App. Div. 528, the court says, "The authorities hold that driving
at a rate prohibited by law is evidence of negligence." In such cases
as those above the defendant was violating some statute to be sure, but
quite apart from the statute his manner was criminally negligent. As is
pointed out in Schulta v. State, 13o N. W. (Neb.) 972, none of the cases
are based solely on the violation of the statute but on the negligent,
reckless, careless, and dangerous driving of the machine. It seems that
criminal intent will not be imputed from the violation of a speed ordinance
ipso facto, but that such violation would be strong evidence of a wilful
recklessness amounting to criminal negligence.
ELECTRICTY-AcTION FOR INJURY-RES IPSA LOQUITUR.-CAIN V.
SOUTHERN MASSACHUSETTS TELEPHONE CO., 107 N. E. (MASS.) 380.-
Held, In an action for injury by electric shock while the plaintiff was
using a telephone, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applies.
YALE LAW JOURNAL
The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is applied where an accident occurs
which is of such a nature that the natural and reasonable inference is
that it would not have happened in the ordinary course but for the
negligence of the defendant, or when it appears that the facts are so
far within the defendant's exclusive knowledge that it is reasonable
to call upon him for an explanation of the accident. Keasbey on Electric
Wires, Sec. 271; Chape ron v. Portland Electric Co., 41 Ore. 39;
St. Louis v. Bay State Street Railway Co., 216 Mass. 255. Where a
person is lawfully using a public highway in the usual way, and is
injured by an electric shock, these facts establish a prima facie case
in his favor against the company furnishing the electricity. Snyder v.
Wheeling Electrical Co., 43 W. Va. 661; Boyd v. Portland Electric Co.,
40 Ore. 126; Clarke v. Railroad Co., 41 N. Y. Supp. 78. The doctrine
of res ipsa loquitur applies, as in the principal case, where the plaintiff
is injured while using an electrical device on his own premises, where
the wires and appliances are under the control and management of the
defendant. Reynolds v. Narragansett Electric Lighting Co., 26 R. I.
457; Alexvander v. Nanticoke Light Co., 209 Pa. 571; Union Light,
Heat 6 Power Co. v. Lakeman, 156 Ky. 33. But the doctrine does
not apply where the wires and appliances -are under the control of
the plaintiff or some one other than the defendant. Peters v.
Lynchburg Light and Traction Co., lo8 Va. 333; Hill v. Pacific Gas
& Electric Co., 136 Pac. (Cal.) 492; Harter v. Colfax Light & Power
Co., 124 Iowa 5oo. (Contra, Augusta Railway & Electric Co. v. Beagles,
12 Ga. App. 849.) Courts have refused to apply the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur where the evidence of the plaintiff shows that the shock received
from the electrical appliance was probably caused by an act of God.
Rocap v. Bell Telephone Co., 23o Pa. 597; Aliment v. Pennsylvania
Telephone Co., 28 Pa. Super. Ct. 61o.
EVIDENCE-TRAILING BY DoGs.-FITE v. STATE, 84 S. E. (GA.) 485-
Held, when it is established that one or more of the dogs were of the
stock noted for acuteness of sense and power of discrimination, and
had been trained in the exercise of these qualities and were in charge
of one accustomed to use them; and that they were laid on a trail,
which circumstances indicate to have been made by the accused, then the
tracking by the bloodhound may be permitted to go to the jury.
Upon the subject whether the trailing by a bloodhound should be
allowed to go in evidence, there is a square conflict of authorities.
But the majority of courts, in which the cases have come up, have
allowed such "testimony" to go in. State v. Dickerson, 77 Oh. St. 34;
Gallant v. State, 167 Ala. 6o; Davis v. State, 46 Fla. 137; Dunham v.
Commonwealth, 119 Ky. 508; State v. Adams, 116 Pac. (Kans.) 6o8;
Spears v. State, 92 Mich. 613; Parker v. State, 46 Tex- Crim. Rep. 461;
State v. Freeman, 146 N. C. 615. In the following cases, the evidence
was held inadmissible because there was not a sufficient foundation laid,
though the rule is recognized. State v. Norman, 153 N. C. 59,; Stout
v. State, 92 N. E. (Ind.) 161; Sprouse v. Commonwealth, 132 Ky. 269;
Allen v. State, 62 So. (Ala.) 971. The following cases held such evi-
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dence not admissible 'under any circumstances. Brott v. State, 7o Neb.
395; People v. Pfanschmidt, 262 Ill. 411.
The courts which -allow it, allow it only when the conditions as set
out in the headnote are fulfilled. Such evidence is to be strictly
scrutinized. The Nebraska court said: "The blood hound is frequently
right in his conclusions, but that he is frequently wrong is a fact well
attested by experience. It is unsafe evidence, and both reason and
instinct condemn it." It seems that the minority courts are right.
Human life is too sacred to be staked on the scent of a dog.
FRAU>--SALE OF LAND-MISREPRSENTATION OF MEASUREMENTs-O'NEILL
V. CONWAY, 88 Conn. 651.-Held, that a vendor who makes representations
as to the measurements of a plot of land, having no actual knowledge
thereof nor any reasonable ground for believing them, and intending
the vendee to rely thereon, is guilty of a fraud, and it does not matter
that the actual boundaries are pointed out to the vendee and that he has
an opportunity to make the measurements himself, if he does not do so
and actually relies upon the statements of his vendor.
It is generally laid down that a statement made by a vendor with
intent to influence the vendee, of which the vendor is consciously
ignorant, or recklessly indifferent as to whether it is true or false, and
upon which the vendee relies is a fraud. Furnace Co. v. Foundry Co.,
145 Fed. 596; Snively v. Meixsell, 97 I1. App. 365; Miller v. John, 70
N. E. (Ill.) 27; Converse v. Blunrich, 14 Mich. log; Riggs v. Thorpe,
67 Minn. 217; Robertson v. Fry, 144 Pac. (Ore.) 128; Hanson v. Tomp-
kins, 2 Wash. 508. Representations of a vendor as to the quantity of
land in a tract which he offers for sale are not mere matters of opinion,
but are material, and the vendee may rely upon them, unless by the
exercise of ordinary prudence he may readily ascertain their falsity.
Stearns v. Kennedy, 1O3 N. W. (Minn.) 212; McGhee v. Bell, 120 Mo.
121; Conn v. Atwell, 46 N. H. 51o. The vendor, if the representations
be false, cannot avoid their consequences merely because the vendee might
have ascertained their falsity by a survey of the land or by reference
to official plats and records. Porter v. Fletcher, 25 Minn. 493; Miller v.
Wissert, 134 Pac. (Okla.) 62. Nor can he avoid the consequences even
if the true boundaries are pointed out to the vendee. Stearns v. Kennedy,
supra; Shell v. Roseman, 71 S. E. (N. C.) 86; Cawston v. Sturgis,
29 Ore. 331. It is a matter of common knowledge that a man cannot
view a tract of land and arrive at anything like an accurate estimate
of its contents. Boddy v. Conover, 126 Iowa I; Disney v. Lang, go
Kans. 309; Pringle v. Samuel, ii Ky. 43; Starkweather v. Benjamin,
32 Mich. 305; Judd v. Walker, 114 Mo. App. 128. Ordinary prudence
does not require a survey and measurement thereof but the vendee may
rely upon the positive statements of his vendor. Ledbetter v. Davis, 22
N. E. (Ind.) 744; Judd v. Walker, supra. The Massachusetts rule is
contra. "If the representations relate to the number of acres within
boundaries which are pointed out, they are not actionable, for they are
to be regarded as the usual and ordinary means adopted by sellers
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to obtain a high price." Mooney v. Miller, l02 Mass. 217; Credle v.
Swindell, 63 N. C. 3o5. The Massachusetts rule is criticized in Shuttle-
field v. Neil, 145 N. W. (Iowa) i, and is followed in but a very few
jurisdictions.
INDICTMENT AND INFORMATIN-VARIANcE-NAMIE OF PERSON INJURED.-
PEOPLE v. ANDERSON, 107 N. W. (ILL.) 84o.-Held, that proof of an
assault upon "Olson," the husband of the person filing the information,
will not support a conviction where the information names "Jonas Olson"
as the person assaulted.
The general rule is that the name of the person injured must be
proved as laid, and variance between the allegation and proof in this
particular is fatal. Milontree v'. State, 3o Tex. App. 151. The Christian
name of the person injured must be proved as charged, and variance
between allegation and proof thereof is fatal. Meyer v. State, 5o Ind.
18; Hughes v. State, 41 Cal. 234; Lewis v. State, go Ga. 95. In
Colorado it has even been held that there is a fatal variance between
the allegation of ownership in Michael Johnson and proof of ownership
in Mike Johnson. Sullivan v. People, 6 Colo. App. 458. Some courts,
however, have made exception to the general rule. Where a name is
spelled in two ways in an indictment and proved one way, there is
no variance. Davenport v. State, 38 Ga. 184. If the variance is so
slight that the person would have been readily known by the name
used such variance is immaterial. Aaron v. State, 37 Ala. io6. In some
cases, in event of a slight variance, the question of identity has been
held to be one for the jury. McLain v. State, 71 Ga. 279. In Bennett v.
United States, 194 Fed. 63o (affirmed 227 U. S. 333), it was held that
where the record clearly indicates the identity there is no variance though
the Christian name alleged is not that proved. In Joyce v. State,
2 Swan (Tenn.) 667, it was held that the objection of lack of proof of
the Christian name of the deceased was too technical and insufficient
to disturb the verdict, no question as to the name of the deceased having
been raised at the trial. This case cannot be said to be contra to the
principal case since it does not clearly appear in the report of the
latter just when the question of identity was first raised. The holding
of the principal case seems overtechnical. It would seem preferable
to leave the question of identity to the jury.
MANDAmus-LIABILITY OF GOVERNOR-MINISTERIAL DUTiEs.-GANTEN-
BEIN V. WEST, 144 PAC. (ORE.) I17I.-Held, that the governor of a state
is subject to a writ of mandamus to compel the performance of minis-
terial duties.
It was early decided that the head of an executive department was
amenable to judicial control in the performance of ministerial functions.
Kendall v. U. S., 12 Pet. (U. S.) 524; see Marbury v. Madison, I
Cranch (U. S.) 137. Contra, State v. Dike, 2o Minn. 363; R. R. Co. v.
Randolph, 24 Tex. 317. Many courts have proceeded on the assumption
that the governor of a state fell within the same principle. Magruder vu.
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Swann, 25 Md. 173; State v. Nash, 66 Oh. St. 612; State v. Savage, 64
Neb. 684; and cases cited in People v. Morton, 156 N. Y. 136. Some of
these assume, though none have been called upon to decide, that the
writ could be enforced against the governor, if necessary. Martin v.
Inghal, 38 Kans. 641; Magruder v. Swann, supra. Such authority
as has been found is adverse to such a contention. Thompson v. R. R.
Co., 22 N. J. Eq. III (subpoena); Hartranft's Appeal, 85 Pa. 433
(subpoena). See Burrs Trial, 182 (subpoena). More often it is
assumed that the enforcement of the decree is merely a question of
physical, and not legal, inability, and as such an irrelevant considera-
tion in a judicial proceeding. Cotton v. Ellis, 52 N. C. 545. By the
weight of authority, mandamus will not lie against the chief executive
officer. People v. Governor, 29 Mich. 320; State v. Stone, 120 Mo. 428;
Rice v. Governor, 207 Mass. 577; People v. Morton, 156 N. Y. 136, and
cases there cited. This immunity cannot be waived by appearance.
Rice v. Austin, 19 Minn. IO3; State v. Governor, 25 N. J. L. 331. Contra,
see State v. Board of Inspectors, 6 Lea (Tenn.) 12; People V. Bissell,
19 Ill. 229. Where, however, the question of the jurisdiction of the court
is not raised, the court proceeds as if it had authority. Governor v. Nel-
son, 6 Ind. 496. An exception is sometimes made in the case of a function
to be performed by the governor as an ex officio member of a statutory
board. Gray v. State, 72 Ind. 567. Cf. Davis v. Gray, I6 Wall. (U. S.)
2o3. By the better view, however, the immunity extends to all duties
imposed upon the governor ex nomine. People v. Morton, supra; State
v. Frazier, 114 Tenn. 516. There seems no reason why the process
should not issue against the other members of the board, wherever
their action, apart from that of the governor, would control. See
People v. Morton, supra; State v. Huston, 27 Okla. 6o6. But it has
been held that process must issue against all the members or none.
McFall v. Board, IOI Tex. 572. Under our co~rdinate system of gov-
ernmental departments, it seems clear that mandamus proceedings against
that officer from whose support the court derives all its power to issue
compulsory process, are an anomaly, the objection to which has been
concisely stated: "Such a judgment would be mere advice, and courts
do not advise." R. R. Co. v. Lowry, 61 Miss. lO2.
MONOPOLY-CONSPIRACY OF MEMBERs OF TRAD UNIoNs-CIRcuLATioN
OF UNFAIR LISs.-LAwLoR V. LOEWE, 59 U. S. (L. Ed.) I7o.-Held, the
circulation of a list of "unfair dealers," manifestly intended to put a
ban upon those whose names appear therein among an important body
of possible customers, combined with a view to joint action and in
anticipation of such reports, is within the prohibition of the Sherman
Anti-Trust Act of July 2, 189o (26 Stat. at L. 209, chap. 647), if it is
intended to restrain and does restrain commerce among the states.
It has been held that a combination to obtain a monopoly in the
manufacture of a necessary is not illegal under the Sherman Anti-Trust
Act though it tends indirectly to restrain interstate trade. U. S. v.
E. C. Knight & Co., 156 U. S. I. Harlan, J., dissenting. Where the
effect of the monopoly is to directly restrain interstate commerce, it
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does come within the Sherman Act. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. U. S.,
175 U. S. 211; Swift & Co. v. U. S., 196 U. S. 375. Later cases held
that every combination in restraint of interstate trade comes within the
Anti-Trust Act of July 2, 18go. U. S. v. Trans-Missouri Freight Associa-
tion, 166 U. S. 290; Northern Securities Co. v. U. S., 193 U. S. 197. But
this doctrine has been modified by the "rule of reason." Standard Oil
Co. of N. J. v. U. S., 221 U. S. I. Harlan, J., dissenting; U. S. v.
American Tobacco Co., 221 U. S. lo6. Harlan, J., dissenting; U. S. v.
International Harvester Co., 214 Fed. 987. Sanborn, J., dissenting. In
the Standard Oil case the court said that the legislature "not specifying
but indubitably contemplating and requiring a standard, it follows that
the standard of reason . . . was intended to be the measure used
for the purpose of determining whether in a given case a particular act
had or had not brought about the wrong against which the statute pro-
vided." The statute covers combinations of labor as well as combina-
tions of capital. Gompers v. Buck Stove & Range Co., 221 U. S. 418;
Montague v. Lowry, 193 U. S. 38; Irving v. Neal, 2o9 Fed. 471. The
circulation by a combination of such information among possible cus-
tomers which had and was intended to have the natural effect of caus-
ing such customers to withhold patronage from the concerns listed, was
held to come within the Sherman law. Eastern States Lumber Co. v.
U. S., 234 U. S. 6oo. The opinion has been advanced that the Clayton
Bill passed by the 63d Congress, Oct. 15, 1914, has taken labor organiza-
tions out of the operation of the Sherman act, but a careful review of
the report of the committee shows that that bill merely meant to prevent
the construction that associations for increasing wages and bettering
terms of employment, where that employment is in interstate commerce,
be considered per se illegal restraints of trade. The language of the act
is that nothing in the anti-trust laws shall be construed to forbid the
members of labor organizations from "lawfully carrying out the legi-
timate objects thereof." This clearly still leaves to the courts the appli-
cation of a standard, and does not effect the decision of the principal
case where the methods were not lawful, and the object was not legitimate.
NEGLIGENCE-CONTRIBUTORY-BURDEI" op PROOF-CARNEY V. BOSTON
ELEVATED Ry., 1o7 N. E. (MASS.) 41.-Held, the burden is upon the
plaintiff, who is engaged in a dangerous occupation, to prove the absence
of contributory negligence, in an action against his employer for injuries
sustained in the course of that employment.
The doctrine of this case is followed in eleven of the states, while
twenty-three states and the Supreme Court of the United States hold the
contrary view; namely, -that contributory negligence is a matter of
defense to be set up and proved by the defendant. See Shearman &
Redfield on Negligence (4th Ed.), p. i8o. The elements of the plain-
tiff's position in the principal case seem to be closely analogous to those
of the defendants' in cases where the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is
applied; where the thing is shown to be under the control of the
defendant (plaintiff in this case) or his servants, and the accident is such
as in the ordinary course of things does not happen if proper care be
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used, it affords reasonable evidence, in the absence of explanation by
the defendant (plaintiff here) that the accident arose from lack of
proper care. Muskogee Electric Traction Co. v. Mclntire, 37 Okla. 684;
McNulty v. Ludwig & Co., 153 App. Div. 2o6; The Joseph B. Thomas,
81 Fed. 578. The application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur
does not shift the burden of proof. In fact, it does not even
raise a presumption-that is, evidence sufficient to invoke this prin-
ciple may not be sufficient to justify a directed verdict, in absence
of rebuttal by defendant, but it must be presented to the jury and is
sufficient to support an inference by the jury that the defendant was
negligent. 24 Yale Law Journal 255 (Jan. 1915 and cases cited. A
minority of jurisdictions (illustrated by the principal case),-as shown
above, go further as to contributory negligence and say that not only is
a presumption raised but the burden of proof is shifted. The majority
holding is contra.
PRINCIPAL AND AGENT-SALE OF PxINcnAL's PROPERTY BY AGENT TO
HImSELF.-HUTTON ET AL. V. SHERRARD ET AL., I5o N. W. (MIcH.) 135.-
Held, where agents have authority to sell land for a principal retaining
for their compensation that part of the purchase price received over
and above a minimum price specified, such agents may make a valid
sale to themselves without previous consent or ratification by the principal.
It is a general rule of equity of universal application that parties in
a position of trust with respect to a thing are not allowed to purchase
that thing for themselves. Grubbs v. McGlawn, 39 Ga. 676; Lamar's
Ex'rs. v. Hale, 79 Va. 158. This rule applies to agents whose relation
to their principals precludes them from obtaining any advantage over
their principals in any transaction had by virtue of the agency. Calmon
v. Saraille, 142 Cal. 638; Fairman v. Bavin, 29 Ill. 75. An agent is
bound to exercise his agency in the mode in which he knew his prin-
cipal intended it to be carried out. Hofflin v. Moss, 67 Fed. 44o. The
reason for the general rule, as applied to agency, is the protection of
the principal's interest from possible subordination to the interest of the
agent. Porter v. Woodruff, 36 N. J. Eq. 174; Rochford Watch Co. V.
Manifold, 36 Nebr. 8ol. Many cases cite the rule without exceptions,
but a majority of jurisdictions hold that a purchase by the agent is
binding if made with the previous consent or subsequent ratification
of the principal, the principal having full knowledge of all the facts
at the agent's command. Burke v. Boutrs, 98 Cal. 171; Rochester v.
Levering, 1O4 Ind. 562. If such sale is made without the previous
consent of the principal it is voidable at the option of the principal
even in the absence of fraud. Rockford Watch Co. v. Manifold, supra;
Bain v. Brozn, 56 N. Y. 285. Although the agent has a power of
attorney to convey, a conveyance to himself would not give him title
as against the principal. Cleveland Ins. Co. v. Reed, I Biss. i8o.
There seems to be only three adjudicated cases precisely on all fours
with the principal case. Synnott v. Shaughnessy, 2 Idaho 122, cited by
the court, is in accord, the majority opinion holding that the contract
of agency, which is like that in the principal case, is a verbal option.
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Cheegum v. Kreighbaum, 4 Wash. 68o, holds that such a contract cannot
be construed as an option; that it is only a power to sell, and that
the agent is allowed to get no benefit from such a contract save his
commission. Meek v. Hurst, 223 Mo. 688, is also contra to the principal
case, holding that the agent should not be allowed to purchase on
grounds of public policy, which requires the agent's eye to be kept clear
to the principal's welfare. The reasoning in the last case is not con-
vincing and the other two were decided by divided courts. The doctrine
of the principal case seems sound.
PROcEss-SERvIcE BY TELEPHONE.-LowMAN & Co. v. BALLARD, 84 S. E.
(N. C.) 2i.-Held, under a statute which required that a summons be
read to the party or parties defendant, the reading of a summons over
the telephone where the sheriff recognized the voice of the defendant
was not a valid service. Clark, C. J., and Allen, J., dissenting.
On the point which arose in the principal case there is a dearth of
authority. Only one case involving service of process has been found
though it is possible to draw analogies from somewhat similar cases
along other lines. It has been held that the service of a subpoena by
telephone was not a legal service. Ex Parte Terrell, 95 S. W. (Tex.)
536. Where demand on a promissory note was made over telephone it
was held that the demand was invalid. Gilpin v. Savage, 2O N. Y. 167.
On the other hand, it was remarked in Thompson Co. v. Appleby, 5 Kans.
App. 68, that such demand can properly be made over a telephone if the
holder of the note is sure that he is talking to the right party. In that
case he was not. The cases which hold such demand invalid are at any
rate put upon a ground which does not apply to the recent cases, namely,
that the note must be shown to the maker. It has been held that an
oath or acknowledgment cannot be taken over the telephone. Sullivan
v. First National Bank, 37 Tex. Civ. App. 238. These meagre authori-
ties would seem to cast great doubt upon the validity of such a service by
telephone. The words of the statute would permit a service by telephone
if taken literally, but, as the court points out, the statute is older than
the use of the telephone-at least its general use. The fact that the
legislature never intended such a service, the uncertainties and abuses
which are likely to attend it, coupled with the fact that it is really an
uncalled for innovation, would seem to justify the holding of the princi-
pal case.
QUASI-CONTRACTS-PLAINTIFF IN WILFUL DEFAULT-BUILDING CON-
TRACTS.-MALLORY ET AL. V. CITY OF OLYMPIA, 145 PAC. (WASH.) 627.-
Held, where the plaintiff wilfully and inexcusably abandoned his build-
ing contract with the defendant, and the defendant has, pursuant to an
express provision of the contract, taken over and completed the work,
the plaintiff can recover the reasonable value of his labor and materials.
Where the plaintiff has wilfully and inexcusably refused to perform
the conditions of an express contract, the general rule is that he can not
recover for the benefit conferred upon the defendant. Keener on Quasi-
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Contracts, p. 215; Johnson v. Fehsefeldt, io6 Minn. 2o2. But if the con-
tract was for the sale of goods, he can recover the value of the goods
delivered, on the theory that there has been a severance of the
entire contract. Bowker v. Hoyt, iS Pick. (Mass.) 555. Contra, Catlin
v. ToNas, 26 N. Y. 217. In contract for services, a few jurisdictions allow
recovery quantum ineruit less the damage, if any, caused by the plaintiff's
breach. Britton v. Turner, 6 N. H. 481; Porter v. Whitlock, i42 Iowa
66. Also in building contracts, a recovery quantum nzeruit is sometimes
allowed a plaintiff who has wilfully abandoned his contract, following the
rule in Britton, v. Turner, mpra. Linnenkohl v. Winkemeyer, 54 Mo.
App. 57o. But there must have been a real benefit to the owner. Globe
Company v. Doud, 47 Mo. App. 439. Contra, Hollis v. Chapman, 36 Tex.
i. The weight of authority, however, is clearly that a plaintiff in wil-
full default on a building contract can have no recovery. Woodward,
The Law of Quasi-Contracts, p. 271; Malbon v,. Birney, ixi Wis. io7;
Mortimer v. Dirks, 57 Wash. 402. But in the presence of such provision
as in the principal case, there can always be a recovery. Bader v. City
of New York, ioi N. Y. Supp. 351. The recovery is not quasi-contrac-
tual, as the principal case holds, but is on the express contract, and equals
the contract price less the cost of completion. Construction Company v.
Jeunesse, 14o Ky. 833; McKee v. Rapp, 35 N. Y. Supp. 175; O'Brien v.
Garibaldi, 115 Pac. (Cal.) 249. The provision is held to give the owner
the option of declaring the contract null or of continuing it with his own
performance. Ogden v. Alexander, 14o N. Y. 356. It follows, therefore,
that the right of the contractor accrues only on completion of the build-
ing by the owner. Denison v. Burrell, 119 Cal. i8o.
